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economies by means of a gravity model of trade fitted on a panel 
dataset for the 21 APEC member economies.  The aim was to 
determine whether this agreement can be beneficial for both countries 
and, in passing, to contribute to the development of a more objective 
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hand, the methodology adopted proves to be pertinent as a first step 
in the development of such rationale. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The ideal of achieving free and open trade in the Pacific Rim1) has been 
cherished by all the governments and international cooperation bodies in the 
region for the last several decades.  This has been especially the case of the 
large trans-Pacific organisations that have been set up to promote economic 
exchange and cooperation in this part of the world: the Pacific Basin 
Economic Council (PBEC), the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council 
(PECC), and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum (APEC).2)  
The youngest of those organisations, APEC is also the ablest thanks to the 
direct involvement and participation of the heads of state and/or government 
of its member countries in its tasks and initiatives who pledged to achieve 
free and open trade among them in their summit meeting in Bogor, Indonesia 
in November 1994.  This goal was to be reached no later than 2010 and 2020 
in APEC’s developed and developing economies, respectively, “in a GATT-
consistent manner” (http://www.apec.org) and in line with the concept of 
open regionalism.3)  The task was meant to be accomplished by way of trade 
policy instruments consistent with those principles. 
Accordingly, APEC formally adopted a non-discriminatory, multilateral 
approach to trade liberalisation via non-binding accords in tune with the rules 
established first by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and 
then by the World Trade Organisation (WTO), especially the most favoured 
nation (MFN) clause.  In practice, however, most of its members soon started 
to resort to binding instruments instead in the form of bilateral free trade 
agreements (FTAs) and plurilateral regional trade arrangements (RTAs). 
                                                   
1) Refers to the trans-continental region formed by all the states and territories lying on the 
Western and Eastern sides of the Pacific Ocean. 
2) APEC was launched in 1989 with representatives from 21 economies, PECC in 1980 as a 
tripartite organisation with representatives from 25 countries, and PBEC in 1967 by 
business representatives from some 20 economies in all three cases from both the Western 
and the Eastern Pacific. 
3) Put forward in the late 1970s by Japan’s then Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira, this concept 
basically refers to the idea of promoting the liberalisation of trade in a given region while 
simultaneously opening it up to the rest of the world.  See Kuwayama (1999) for a detailed 
discussion of the several ways in which this concept has been defined. 
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APEC itself officially ended up endorsing and even praising the use of FTAs 
and RTAs to advance trade liberalisation in the Pacific (http://www.apec.org/ 
en/Groups/Other-Groups/FTA_RTA.aspx). 
As a result, FTAs and RTAs proliferated over the 1990s in the Western 
Pacific (Pomfret, 2009), giving rise to an intricate network of overlapping 
trade links that was dubbed as a “spaghetti bowl” (Baldwin, 2006; Baldwin 
and Thornton, 2008).  In the 2000s the bowl extended across the Pacific with 
the signing of FTAs between Asian and American countries.  
As active members of both APEC and all the other regional economic 
cooperation bodies, Mexico and South Korea have been keen advocates of 
free trade and trans-Pacific integration. Notwithstanding, the economic 
exchange they have maintained over the last half a century has been quite 
scant, so that the establishment of an FTA has appeared as a sensible strategy 
to expand that exchange.  The task, though, is to prove that this is the case. 
A number of studies have been produced to that end in government and 
academic circles in both Mexico and South Korea over the last years.  These 
studies have mainly consisted of argumentative analyses of the economic and 
diplomatic links between the two countries or historical recounts of the talks 
and negotiations held so far between the two governments (e.g., Romero, 
2011; 21st Century Commission, 2005), and evaluations of alternative kinds 
of accords considering possible scenarios (Uscanga, 2007).  On those bases, 
the pros and cons of this FTA are then inferred or argued for. 
The one reported in this paper seeks to go beyond those studies by 
including a more complete analysis of trade and investment flows as well as 
a formal assessment of the potential for enhancing trade exchange between 
the two economies by means of established econometric tools, specifically a 
gravity model of trade.  A related goal is to contribute to the development of 
a more formal and systematic methodology for assessing the pertinence and 
desirability of this kind of agreements.  The one in question is viewed as the 
most ambitious and promising initiative for increasing economic exchange 
between Mexico and South Korea and at the same time as a substantive step 
toward an effective liberalisation of trans-Pacific trade in general. 
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First, a cursory recount of previous bilateral trade accords signed by the 
two partners is presented, followed by a detailed examination of the main 
economic flows between the two countries over the last two decades.  
Against that backdrop, the potential for further trade between them is 
assessed by means of the gravity model referred to above.  Finally, the results 
of all those analyses are discussed and their overall implications pondered. 
The exposition closes with some concluding remarks. 
 
 
2. PREVIOUS ACCORDS AND THE STEPS  
TOWARD AN FTA 
 
Economic and political interaction between Mexico and South Korea 
began formally with the establishment of full diplomatic relations in 1962.  
Commercial exchange proper was fostered a few years later with the 
subscription of a Trade Agreement between the Republic of Korea and the 
United Mexican States on December 12, 1966, the first trade accord ever 
signed by Mexico with an Asian country. 
Bilateral ties were further strengthened in the late 1980s with the 
subscription, in 1989, of an agreement to promote economic, scientific and 
technical cooperation and, especially, the creation of the Mexico-South 
Korea Joint Commission.  In September 1991 President Roh Tae Woo was in 
México and became the first South Korean head of state to visit a Latin 
American country. 
The ties continued to be solidified over the following years with the 
signing of a series of bilateral agreements (double taxation and income tax 
evasion; cooperation in tourism; promotion and reciprocal protection of 
investments) and with the establishment, in June 2001, of the Mexico-Korea 
21st Century Commission, a bi-national body charged with the mandate of 
formulating strategies to strengthen the diplomatic and economic relations 
between the two nations.  Moreover, in 2005 the two governments decided to 
start negotiations toward a Strategic Economic Complementation Agreement 
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which was intended to encompass a wider range of areas of their economic 
exchange; the negotiations continued for several months but collapsed in late 
2006.  
Building on all the above initiatives, Mexico and South Korea agreed to 
begin negotiations for the establishment of a full FTA in December 
2007.  Although both governments have been officially committed thereafter 
to move forward with the negotiations, and ultimately to sign the deal, only 
one more round has taken place to date, in June 2008.  
Nevertheless, the fact is that the two governments have remained officially 
committed to complete the project on the basis of their mutual conviction 
about “the necessity to tap the huge potential the relation between Mexico 
and the Republic of Korea holds” (21st Century Commission, 2005, p. 9).  
An examination of the exchange between the two economies over the last 
several decades will provide a proper perspective for a formal assessment of 
that potential. 
 
 
3. TRADE AND INVESTMENT CROSS-FLOWS 
 
3.1. Investment 
 
South Korean investments began to land in Mexico in the late 1980s when 
Goldstar — now LG — and Samsung started to build plants for the assembly 
of colour TV sets in Tijuana in 1987 and 1988, respectively.  Hyundai did so 
in 1991, Daewoo in 1993, and POSCO in 2006 (http://www. 
maquilareference.com).  Up to the late 1990s, the amounts invested yearly 
were rather small, except for two years when the figures increased 
significantly, as table 1 shows. 
Things improved slightly in the 2000s.  As table 2 presents, annual flows 
in this period were larger and more consistent, surging up to US$350 
million in 2008 and totalling nearly US$900 million dollars in this period 
vis-à-vis a little more than US$500 million in the 1990s.  Most of the 2008 inflow 
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Table 1 South Korean Direct Investment in Mexico, 
1989-1999 (Million US Dollars) 
Year Annual Cumulative % of Total 
1989-1990 1.5 - 0.0 
1991 2.5 4 0.1 
1992 0.04 4.04 0.0 
1993 8.4 12.44 0.2 
1994 15.1 27.54 0.1 
1995 103.7 131.24 1.2 
1996 85.8 217.04 1.1 
1997 199.2 416.24 1.6 
1998 52.6 468.84 0.6 
1999 46.2 515.04 0.3 
Source: 21st Century Commission (2005), tables 2 and 3. 
 
Table 2 South Korean Direct Investment in Mexico, 
2000-2010 (Million US Dollars) 
Year Annual Cumulative % of Total 
2000 30.2 - 0.2 
2001 50.5 80.7 0.2 
2002 31.8 112.5 0.1 
2003 57.1 169.6 0.3 
2004 47.6 217.2 0.2 
2005 96.8 314.0 0.4 
2006 72.1 386.1 0.4 
2007 45.2 431.3 0.2 
2008 367.6 798.9 1.5 
2009 75.5 874.4 0.5 
2010 –3.6 870.8 0.0 
Source: Foreign Investment National Registry, Ministry of the Economy. 
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corresponded to POSCO’s investment in a galvanised steel sheets plant in 
Tamaulipas whose construction began that year.  
In any event, South Korean investments have been flowing into Mexico 
consistently for all those years.  As a result, as many as 1,434 companies 
with South Korean capital were operating in Mexico by 2010, as Mexico’s 
Ministry of the Economy reported; these include LG, Samsung, Daewoo, and 
POSCO.  Only LG and Samsung are said to have exported jointly US$7 
billion in 2009 from their subsidiaries emplaced in Mexico (Velazco, 2010). 
However, those investments have not been as significant in relation to 
Mexico’s total inflows of FDI.  As tables 1 and 2 present, South Korean 
capitals have respectively accounted for only 0.5 and 0.4% in average of total 
yearly inflows over the last two decades.  Between 1999 and 2006, though, 
South Korean investment accounted for 7.8% of investments coming from 
Asia Pacific countries so that it ranked third among them (DGIE, 2006, p. 2).  
In any case, the fact remains that there is a huge room for South Korean 
companies to invest in Mexico and tap into the myriad market niches and 
business opportunities this Latin American partner offers to them. 
In contrast, according to the Mexico-South Korea 21st Century 
Commission, cumulative Mexican investments in South Korea had barely 
reached US$200 million by mid-2005 (21st Century Commission, 2005, p. 
59).  According to the Korean Ministry of Knowledge Economy, capital 
inflows from countries of all the Americas except the United States and 
Canada amounted to US$7.2 billion from 2001 to 2010 out of a total of 
US$173.6 billion, i.e. only four percent of this latter figure (http://www.mke. 
go.kr).  It can then be inferred that the proportion of those inflows 
corresponding to investments by Mexican companies was quite below four 
percent. 
Significantly enough, that occurs when the outflow of Mexican capitals to 
other countries has increased unprecedentedly in the last few years.  The 
Bank of Mexico reported that Mexican direct investment abroad amounted to 
US$5.4 billion only in the first quarter of 2010 (Rojas, 2010).  That figure 
was as high as US$8 billion in the first half of that year, which amounted to 
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two thirds of total foreign investment inflows (http://www.elfinanciero-
enlinea. com.mx). 
The point is then that the room for Mexican companies to invest in South 
Korea is much larger than that South Korean concerns have for investing in 
Mexico.  
 
3.2. Trade 
 
Commercial transactions between Mexico and South Korea have been 
increasing consistently since their respective governments signed their first 
bilateral trade accord in 1966.  As figure 1 shows, Mexican exports to and 
imports from South Korea expanded and contracted in a similar pattern up to 
1988.  From that year on Mexico started to post negative trade balances. 
 
Figure 1 Mexico’s Trade Balance with Korea, 
1965-1989 (Thousand US Dollars) 
Source: Table A1, in the Appendix. 
 
Liberalising Trans-Pacific Trade  149 
Figure 2 Mexico’s Trade Balance with Korea, 
1990-2010 (Million US Dollars) 
Source: Table A2, in the Appendix. 
 
Indeed, Mexican exports to South Korea stagnated up to the late 1970s but 
exploded in the early 1980s.  Thus, except for 1980, Mexico registered a 
positive trade balance in the last two years of the 1970s and most of the 
1980s, posting large surpluses around the middle of the latter decade.  At that 
time, though, Mexican exports started to decline and imports started to surge 
so that the balance turned negative in 1988. 
Those trends continued into the 1990s and 2000s.   As figure 2 illustrates, 
Mexican exports stagnated again throughout these two decades the same as 
in the 1960s and 1970s.  Conversely, Mexico’s imports from South Korea 
kept increasing consistently up to 2008 and although they contracted a bit the 
following year, started to expand again in 2010.  
In any case, Mexico’s trade balance with this Asian partner has been 
consistently and increasingly negative during that protracted time span as a 
result.   Conversely, of course, South Korea’s trade balance with Mexico has 
been consistently and increasingly positive throughout the same period. 
Notwithstanding, South Korea was México’s overall sixth trading partner 
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(and its 26th buyer and 4th supplier) in 2009.  In the context of Asia Pacific, 
South Korea was México’s third trading partner (and its 5th buyer and 3rd 
supplier) in that same year (http://www.economia.gob.mx). 
In spite of those imbalances, it is significant that the actual trade between 
the two countries is not of the sort of that between an industrialised and a 
developing economy.  As Box 1 shows, except for salt and beer, all the major 
products exported from Mexico to South Korea are industrial goods. 
 
Box 1 Mexico’s Top Exports to Korea 
- Zinc ores - Aluminium scrap - Mono blocks 
- Lead ores - Refined lead - Alternators  
- Copper ores - Copper mattes - Acrylonitrile 
- Silver ores - Cement coppers - Pre-tanned bovine hides 
- Remote control units - Galvanized steel sheets - Strontium carbonate 
- Memory sets - Pistons and cylinder liners - Alloys 
- Modular circuits - Rings and valves - Salt 
- Cell phones - Cylindrical gear - Malt beer  
Source: Under Ministry of International Trade Negotiations, Ministry of the Economy, 
Mexican Government. 
 
Box 2 Mexico’s Top Imports fom Korea 
- Flat-screen set sub-assemblies  
- Modular circuits   
- Hybrid integrated circuits  
- Cell phones   
- Memory sets   
- Semiconductors   
- Remote control sets   
- Parts for fixed-line telephone sets 
- Washing machines 
- Filters 
- Electrical wires and harnesses 
- Moto compressors 
- Styrene copolymers 
- Epoxy-glass 
- Components for starters and alternators 
- Gasoline 
Source: Under Ministry of International Trade Negotiations, Ministry of the Economy, 
Mexican Government. 
 
Likewise, as Box 2 details, all Mexican imports from South Korea are, as 
can be expected, of an industrial nature too.  In this case, the most unlikely 
item is gasoline given that Mexico is a major producer of crude oil and 
petrochemical products and South Korea is a net importer of petroleum-
related goods in general. 
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Table 3 Mexico’s Top Five Exports and Imports, 2009 (Billion US Dollars) 
Exports Imports 
Product Value % Product Value % 
Crude Oil (Petroleum) 25.9 11.3 Gasoline 8.3 3.5 
Flat Screen TV Appliances 15.7 6.8 Parts for TV Sets 6.6 2.8 
Automobiles 11.3 4.9 Electronics Parts 3.9 1.7 
Mobile Telephones 9.4 4.1 Mobile Phones 3.3 1.4 
Gold Products 3.6 1.6 Automobiles 2.4 1.0 
Other 163.7 71.3 Other 209.9 89.6 
Total 229.6 100.0 Total 234.4 100.0 
Source: Prepared by the author with data from the Under Ministry of International 
Trade Negotiations, Ministry of the Economy, Mexican Government. 
 
Indeed, as table 3 presents, crude oil is Mexico’s top export staple which 
accounts for over 11% of the country’s total exports.  Conversely, gasoline is 
its top import although it accounts for only three and a half percent of total 
imports.  This further illustrates the paradoxical case of gasoline in the 
commercial exchange between Mexico and South Korea, which adds to the 
quantitative imbalances referred to above. 
The point is that trade between these partners is not as asymmetrical as 
their differences in industrial and technological development might imply.  In 
fact, its composition departs from the typical one between Asia and Latin 
America: exports from the former to the latter consist of goods like motor 
vehicles, communication and electronic devices, and some intermediate 
goods like textiles, fabrics, iron and steel; in turn Latin American exports to 
Asia consist largely of commodities like iron ore, soybean, copper, paper and 
food for animals (García-Herrero, 2011, p. 2).  But this also occurs in the 
case of the United States. As Tompkins and Cubitt (2003) observed, U.S. 
imports from Asia-Pacific mainly consist of computers, auto parts, 
electronics and other consumer goods, while U.S. exports to that region are 
mostly commodities like wheat, corn, soybeans and pork, as well as 
manufactured goods. 
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In any event, a more formal assessment of that exchange will shed light on 
the potential that can actually exist for further trade between these transpacific 
partners. 
 
 
3. ASSESSING THE TRADE POTENTIAL BETWEEN 
MEXICO AND SOUTH KOREA 
 
The decision to sign a full FTA between Mexico and South Korea requires 
an objective and convincing rationale based on a proper assessment of the 
potential for trade to expand between the two economies.  To this end, a 
statistical analysis of their cross-trade flows was performed by means of a 
gravity model of trade, an econometric tool that has proved to be adequate 
and efficient for this task.  
Since Linnemann (1966) put forward the first elaborate formulation of 
their analytical potential and Anderson (1979) laid down the corresponding 
theoretical foundations, gravity models have been widely used as an effective 
tool for analysing the structure and behaviour of trade interactions between 
regions and national economies (Baldwin, 1994, p. 70).  
Given the purpose of this study, the model specified here was fitted on a 
panel dataset. Although they have been questioned for their supposed 
inability to estimate the parameters of the model in a consistent way 
(Fontoura et al., 2006; Santos Silva and Tenreyro, 2005), panel datasets have 
several advantages vis-à-vis cross-sectional and time-series (Brüderl, 2005; 
Frees, 2004; Hsiao, 2003).  Among others:  
 Contain a much larger number of observations  
 Allow more variability and more degrees of freedom 
 Decrease collinearity among explanatory variables and so produce 
more efficient estimators 
 Standard errors become smaller and so efficiency increases 
 Allow to control for unobserved heterogeneity, the fundamental 
problem of non-experimental research 
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 Provide means for resolving, or at least reducing, the problem of 
omitted or unobserved variables that are correlated with the 
explanatory variables 
In general, gravity models fitted on panel datasets have the advantage of 
capturing the variation of the predictors stemming from features unique to 
each entity, i.e., their unobserved heterogeneity.  Hence, they have been 
employed by a long spate of authors including: Wang and Winters (1991), 
Hamilton and Winters (1992), Egger (2002), Egger and Pfaffermayr (2003), 
Baldwin (1994), McCallum (1995), Brülhart and Kelly (1999), Fontoura et al. 
(2006), Rahman et al. (2006), Armstrong and Drysdale (2009); and, Ozdeser 
and Ertac (2010).  The model specified here draws on this tradition. 
 
3.1. Data 
 
As pointed out earlier, the assessment of the trade potential between 
Mexico and South Korea was approached from the broader perspective of 
trans-Pacific trade liberalisation.  Hence, APEC’s member economies offered 
a useful statistical framework for the task given that an FTA between these 
two countries would operate under APEC’s institutional and geographic 
context.  A similar approach was adopted by Egger and Pfaffermayr (2003) 
who studied bilateral trade among 11 APEC countries for the period 1982-
1998.  Likewise, Nandasiri and Hur (2008) used an augmented gravity model 
fitted on panel data for the period 1997-2005 to assess the impact of FTAs on 
the trade diversion and creation effects of regional blocs in Asia Pacific. 
In consequence, the dataset assembled in this case consists of 21 panel 
units with yearly observations for a 20-year period spanning from 1990 to 
2009.  A detailed description of the sources, limitations, and main features of 
the data making up this dataset is presented in the Appendix. 
As explained in that appendix, the dataset’s size and extent were ultimately 
determined by the availability of data on the dependent variable in its main 
source: the UN Comtrade database. Thus, the data on the explanatory 
variables included in the model were compiled only for the years for which 
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data on bilateral imports were available in that database. 
 
3.2. Specification of the Model 
 
The one fitted here is an augmented gravity model of trade. It is 
augmented insofar as it includes two variables — GDP per capita and 
adjacency — in addition to the core explanatory variables originally 
considered in this kind of models, i.e., GDP and distance.  
Although there is no general consensus about the inclusion of population 
variables in gravity models, some economists (e.g., Harris and Mátyás, 1998) 
use total population as an independent variable.  GDP per capita has also 
been considered as a relevant explanatory variable and so has been used by 
many authors including Wang and Winters (1991), Baldwin (1994), Egger 
(2002), Martínez Zarzoz and Nowak Lehmann (2003), Egger and 
Pfaffermayr (2003), and Tang and Wang (2006).4)  On those bases, GDP per 
capita was included in the model specified here as a measure of each APEC 
economy’s relative size as weighted by the size of its population.  Moreover, 
since it reflects the level of income as Head (2003) notes, GDP per capita is 
also a measure of both the propensity to trade and the tariff level of the 
trading countries or regions involved.  
Adjacency was included to account, together with distance, for the barriers 
to trade between each country pair.  Distance was represented with data on 
great circle distances between capitals which, as Baldwin (1994, p. 73) put it, 
is a strategy that “is at least extremely transparent”. 
Therefore, the explanatory variables that were included are: GDP, GDP 
per capita, distance, and adjacency or lack thereof.  Although exports are 
widely used, the magnitude that was selected in this case as the dependent 
variable was bilateral import flows between each pair of APEC countries. 
This choice was based on the observation that governments tend to record 
imports with more care and accuracy than exports (Baldwin, 1994). 
In general, the choice of the variables included is in line with the basic 
                                                   
4) GDP per capita is also used as a proxy of a country’s capital-labour ratio (Egger, 2002). 
Liberalising Trans-Pacific Trade  155 
rationale of gravity models.  As Egger (2002, p. 297) stated, “According to 
the traditional concept of the gravity equation, bilateral trade can be 
explained by GDP and GDP per capita figures and both trade impediment 
(distance) and preference factors (common border, common language, etc.)”.  
It is also in tune with the views of economists like McCallum (1995) whose 
celebrated “border puzzle” about trade among Canadian provinces and 
between the latter and US states was based on a model that included 
provincial GDP and distance as its core explanatory variables.  Furthermore, 
it is consistent too with the views of Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) who 
endorsed and complemented McCallum’s model by adding other variables 
meant to account for what they termed as “multilateral resistances,” which 
constituted a significant contribution to strengthening the theoretical 
foundations of gravity models.  
Other economists include additional variables such as FDI flows, exchange 
rates, FTA or RTA membership, and others that account for macro or global 
influences.  However, the inclusion of particular variables in addition to the 
gravity models’ core predictors has to be expressly dictated by the specific 
form of and the theoretical framework within which each model is specified.  
Otherwise, there is no proper way to know how many and which variables to 
include or exclude (Armstrong and Drysdale, 2009).  
As it is commonplace, the parameters of gravity models fitted on panel 
data can be estimated using either fixed-effects (FE) or random-effects (RE) 
estimators.  Each of these has its own merits and limitations, so their 
suitability depends on the nature of the data used and the objectives of the 
model in question. 
A fixed-effects estimator is always consistent but not always efficient, 
while a random-effects estimator tends to be more efficient but not always 
consistent.  The main issue, though, is whether endogeneity is present or not 
in the model or, in formal terms, whether:  
 
Cov( ,  )  or  Cov( ,  ) 0.≠ =it it it itx e x e  
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This issue can be resolved by means of a Hausman test which basically 
determines whether endogeneity is present and whether the model is well 
specified and consistent with the data used (Hausman, 1978).  If endogeneity 
is not present then the FE estimator would be biased and inconsistent and so 
not suitable for estimating the parameters of the model.  Conversely, if 
endogeneity exists, the RE estimator would be biased and so would not be 
efficient for that estimation; hence FE would be the right estimator in this case. 
The model specified here was estimated using both methods in order to 
generate the elements required for running a Hausman test.  On the other 
hand, since all gravity models are derived from Newton’s gravity equation, 
all the variables are expressed in natural logarithms, except for adjacency 
which is represented by a dummy.  On those bases, the model estimated was 
the following: 
 
1 2 3
4 5 6
ln ln ln ln
 ln ,
it it jt it
jt ij ij i ijt
y GDPi GDPx GDPcapi
GDPcapx dist border
β β β
β β β α ε
= + +
+ + + + +
 
 
where: 
ln ity : stands for imports from country j to country i, 
ln itGDPi :  for the importing country i’s GDP, 
ln itGDPx : for the exporting country j’s GDP, 
ln iGDPcapi : for the importing country i’s GDP per capita, 
ln jGDPcapx : for the exporting country j’s GDP per capita, 
ln ijdist : for the great circle distance between country i’s and j’s capital cities, 
ijborder : for whether a common border exists in each country pair, 
iα : for the unknown intercept for each panel entity (country), and 
ijtε : for the error term. 
 
The FE method was chosen subsequently to estimate the model’s 
coefficients in view that it focuses on within-group variation and controls for 
the effects of the countries’ fixed characteristics.  Thus by using observations 
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on each country for several years, this method permits one to remove the 
omitted variable bias incurred when using conventional time-series or cross-
section models which can only capture between-group variation.  In other 
words, FE controls for the influence of omitted factors that may be correlated 
with the predictors within each panel. 
 
3.4. Model Results 
 
Table 4 summarises the results of the regressions performed on the above 
model, as well as some basic references about the dataset on which they were run. 
 
Table 4 Panel Regression Results for Bilateral Imports 
among APEC Economies 1990-2009 
Independent Variables Fixed Effects Random Effects GLS 
Log of Importing Country GDP 0.0767 (0.1206) 
0.5881 
(0.0684) 
Log of Exporting Country GDP 0.9622 (0.0104) 
0.9605 
(0.0104) 
Log of Importing Country GDP per Capita 0.6442 (0.1416) 
0.1144 
(0.0822) 
Log of Exporting Country GDP per Capita 0.0096 (0.0133) 
0.0077 
(0.0133) 
Log of Distance –1.1828 (0.0233) 
–1.1824 
(0.0233) 
Border 0.1233 (0.1074) 
0.1300 
(0.1076) 
Constant –2.4259 (2.0459) 
–1.2394 
(1.2638) 
R2 within 0.6557 0.6548 
R2 between 0.2319 0.8870 
R2 Overall 0.5319 0.6903 
Hausman Statistic - 0.0001 
No. of Observations 7,149 7,149 
No. of Country Pairs 398 398 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.  
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As can be observed, all the coefficients are different from zero (Prob > F = 
0.0000) and all the signs are in the expected direction so that the specification 
of the model can be said to be consistent with the basic rationale of gravity 
models.  This consistency is also reflected by the rather high correlation 
coefficients (R2s).  This means that bilateral import flows between APEC 
countries were largely determined by their absolute and relative economic 
size as measured by total GDP and per capita GDP, the geographic distance 
between each other, and their being or not adjacent to each other. 
Given that the Hausman test returned a p-value of 0.0001 it can be inferred 
that the differences among estimators are systematic.  Likewise, since this 
value is below the 0.01 significance level adopted in the regressions the 
results can be said to be statistically significant and the presence of 
endogeneity can be established, i.e., Cov (xit, eit) ≠ 0. 
Therefore, FE was confirmed as the proper estimator in this case, as it is 
the one that, unlike RE, can produce unbiased estimates.  In fact, since 
endogeneity is present in most panel data models, FE tends to be used more 
commonly than RE (Brüderl, 2005).  The study reported in this paper is a 
case in point. 
On those bases, the potential for further trade among APEC economies 
was estimated next following the usual procedure of plugging in the 
estimated coefficients into the model and fitting a linear projection of the 
actual trade flows that took place in the period under study.5)  This projection 
constitutes the counterfactual, i.e., the trade flows that could have been 
generated between each APEC country pair during that period if their 
respective production and export capacities had been used to the full. 
Next, the ratios of potential — as represented by the projected figures — 
to actual bilateral imports were calculated in order to determine the trade that 
could have taken place between each country pair during the study period.  A 
ratio higher than one indicates that yearly exports from the exporting to the 
importing country were below their potential levels and so that they can 
                                                   
5) This procedure can be performed most efficiently nowadays with any major econometrics 
software package, especially Stata, the one used in this study. 
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increase beyond that period.  In turn, a ratio smaller than unity means the 
opposite, i.e., that exports were above potential and so that there is no room 
for them to expand. 
Tables A3 and A4 in the Appendix present the resulting trade potential 
ratios for the 398 pairs of APEC economies for the terminal year of the study 
period: 2009.  The overly large ratios for Brunei, Peru and Russia owe to the 
overly small figures the U.N. Comtrade database records for their respective 
import flows for several years of that period.  
It is significant that the highest average ratios are posted by APEC’s Latin 
American economies: Mexico and Chile (Peru is put aside because of the 
said problem with the data on its import figures).  The next highest averages 
correspond to Taiwan and New Zealand, on the Western Pacific.  These are 
the four APEC members that have more room for expanding their imports 
from other fellow members.  Overall, more than two thirds of the average 
ratios are positive, which indicates that bilateral exports among most — 14 of 
21 — APEC economies were below their potential levels during the 1990s 
and the 2000s and so that they can increase in the future.  
The picture is mixed when it comes to trade flows between Mexico and 
South Korea.  In this case, the respective trade potential ratios were 
calculated for each of the 20 years of the period of the study in order to 
highlight the fluctuations in the size of that potential during this period.  
Table 5 presents the results. 
In a clear instance of asymmetrical trade, all the ratios of potential to 
actual imports turned out to be negative for Mexico — except for 1990 and 
1991 — and positive for South Korea over the two decades.  This means that 
Mexican actual exports to South Korea were above the level they could have 
reached in those years and so that there is no scope for them to grow 
hereafter.  This in turn can be taken to indicate that South Korea’s trade 
barriers to Mexican exports have been lower than Mexico’s to South Korean 
exports.  Therefore, an FTA would be a suitable instrument to widen the 
access to Mexican markets for South Korean exports.  Conversely, South 
Korean exports to Mexico were quite below their potential, so that the room 
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Table 5 Mexico and Korea: Bilateral Trade Potential Ratios (Imports) 
Year Importer Exporter Ratio Importer Exporter Ratio 
1990 Mexico Korea 1.020 Korea Mexico 1.085 
1991 Mexico Korea 2.907 Korea Mexico 1.693 
1992 Mexico Korea 0.622 Korea Mexico 2.648 
1993 Mexico Korea 0.707 Korea Mexico 3.402 
1994 Mexico Korea 0.426 Korea Mexico 2.726 
1995 Mexico Korea 0.472 Korea Mexico 1.598 
1996 Mexico Korea 0.407 Korea Mexico 1.456 
1997 Mexico Korea 0.276 Korea Mexico 1.949 
1998 Mexico Korea 0.173 Korea Mexico 3.021 
1999 Mexico Korea 0.158 Korea Mexico 2.441 
2000 Mexico Korea 0.161 Korea Mexico 2.564 
2001 Mexico Korea 0.167 Korea Mexico 3.711 
2002 Mexico Korea 0.175 Korea Mexico 3.827 
2003 Mexico Korea 0.195 Korea Mexico 3.938 
2004 Mexico Korea 0.180 Korea Mexico 3.747 
2005 Mexico Korea 0.182 Korea Mexico 4.176 
2006 Mexico Korea 0.135 Korea Mexico 2.927 
2007 Mexico Korea 0.131 Korea Mexico 2.652 
2008 Mexico Korea 0.113 Korea Mexico 2.486 
2009 Mexico Korea 0.106 Korea Mexico 1.995 
Average 0.436 Average 2.702 
 
for them to grow has been large and can be larger if barriers to trade are 
reduced and let alone eliminated, a task that can also be accomplished by 
means of an FTA between these two otherwise economically similar trading 
partners. 
In sum, the above results substantiate the argument that the subscription of 
Liberalising Trans-Pacific Trade  161 
a trade agreement would be beneficial for both countries from an economic 
point of view.  On the other hand, since they were gotten by means of an 
established econometric procedure, these results can be a relevant part of a 
formal and objective rationale for assessing the boons of this trade deal and 
thus for informing the decision to sign it. 
A note of caution is in order, however.  For the fact is that trade between 
two economies does not expand mechanically just because a given potential 
for it to increase is shown to exist.  In other words, the mere existence of a 
given potential is not sufficient for bilateral trade to grow.  As Fontoura et al. 
(2006) pointed out, in order for that potential to be realised and be mutually 
beneficial the trading partners involved have to be willing and able to do 
whatever it takes to make a better use of their respective production and 
export capacities.  Only in this way will they be able to take the advantages 
and reap the full benefits an FTA can bring about. 
That circumstance has to be considered seriously particularly by the 
Mexican government given that South Korea has a more industrialised, more 
technologically advanced, and far more productive economy than Mexico.  
For once tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade are reduced, let alone lifted, 
both the volume of goods and services the partners are able to trade with each 
other as well as the benefits that can be derived from the accord in question 
will only depend on their respective production and export capacities. 
 
 
4. APPRAISING THE RESULTS 
 
Overall, the results of the various analyses presented in the preceding 
sections point to the conclusion that the subscription of a full FTA can be a 
sound move for Mexico and South Korea alike.  Therefore, it can be stated 
that, to begin with, these results substantiate the argument that the 
negotiations between the two governments, on hold for over nearly four years, 
should be resumed and, by extension, that the whole initiative be taken to 
completion. 
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The assessment performed by means of the gravity model indicates that 
there is ample room for South Korean exports to Mexico to expand.  On the 
other hand, the negative trade balances that Mexico has consistently posted 
with South Korea over the last two decades indicate that there is a wide scope 
for Mexican exports to South Korea to increase as well.  In both cases the 
most effective way to make that happen is to sign a full FTA for it can 
facilitate the abatement and eventual elimination of tariffs, secure a wider 
access to each other’s markets exports, and level off Mexico’s bilateral trade 
balance with South Korea. 
Likewise, since the room for direct investment flows to increase is huge in 
both directions, especially from Mexico to South Korea, an FTA can also 
help for South Korea to pull down its barriers to FDI so that Mexican capitals 
could enter more freely to South Korea where they have been negligible so 
far.  This seems quite likely in view of the recent surge of Mexican 
investments in other countries, including some in Asia Pacific.  The myriad 
investment opportunities that exist in both economies will do the rest to 
enhance the flow of productive capitals between the two partners across the 
Pacific. 
The pressing need for Mexico to diversify both its foreign trade markets 
and its sources of FDI reinforces those prospects.  More than 80% of its 
exports still go to just one of its trading partners: the United States.  By the 
same token, over half of Mexico’s FDI inflows come from its northern 
neighbour: 52% in 2008, vis-à-vis 33% from Europe (Tagle, 2008).  
South Korea shows a more balanced foreign market structure.  Its main 
export destinations in 2007 were China with 22%, the European Union 15% 
the United States 12%, and Japan seven percent (WTO, 2008, p. 11).  As for 
FDI, the Ministry of Knowledge Economy reports that of the total stock 
accumulated from 1962 to 2010, 34% came from Europe (20% only from the 
Netherlands), 25% from the United States, and 15% from Japan 
(http://www.mke.go.kr/). 
In general, the point to stress is that the economic exchange between 
Mexico and South Korea has been below the level it can potentially reach 
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and quite meagre when looked at in absolute numbers.  This has occurred 
despite the active participation both countries have displayed in all trans-
Pacific economic cooperation bodies, especially APEC, and so the fact that 
they have been for decades strong advocates of the ideal of attaining free 
trade in the region.  Like their fellow members in those organisations, the 
Mexican and South Korean governments pledged to reach that goal via non-
binding, multilateral channels in tune with the concept of open regionalism. 
However, they are resorting once more to a binding, bilateral instrument in 
order to effectively liberalise their trade with each other and so to enhance it 
in a managed way with the certainty and formality only that kind of 
instruments can provide. 
If it is considered that in 1993 Mexico posted a deficit of US$2.4 billion 
with the USA and that by 2009 that deficit had turned into a surplus topping 
US$72 billion under NAFTA (Villarreal, 2010, pp. 13-14), it can well be 
expected that the same can happen to this Latin American country under a 
full FTA with South Korea. 
That prospect is reinforced by the fact that Asia Pacific has been a priority 
region for Mexico since the late 1980s, well before entering into the 
negotiations for NAFTA. Conversely, Latin American markets are 
considered as a major target in South Korea’s FTA Roadmap since it was 
chartered in 2003.  As a result, in 2009 South Korean exports to Latin 
America accounted for 20% of Asia’s total, while Japan’s did so for only 
16%.  In turn, Mexican exports to Asia only accounted for 9.5% of Latin 
America’s total, a proportion well below those of Brazil and Chile which 
accounted for 44% and 27% respectively (García-Herrero, 2011, p. 3).  It 
goes without saying that Mexico’s low participation is a reflection of the 
notably low volume of Mexican exports to South Korea discussed above. 
In sum, the results discussed in the foregoing paragraphs provide sufficient 
ground to assert that a full FTA can be beneficial for both Mexico and South 
Korea and, by extension, that the decision to resume the negotiations and 
finalise this accord can be well founded.  However, this decision will depend 
crucially on the extent to which South Korean government is willing to 
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remove the tariff and non-tariff barriers it still has in place, in particular to 
ease its resistance to open up its primary sector markets to Mexican 
agricultural and agro industrial products; conversely, it will also depend 
on the willingness of the Mexican government to persuade the opposing 
sectors to overcome their fears and face competition from South Korean 
companies.  
In any event, the decision at both ends will ultimately rest on 
considerations about the economic benefits each government perceives the 
agreement can entail for its respective country.  The study reported in this 
paper provides statistical evidence that substantiate the perception that those 
benefits can in effect flow under the codes and provisions only a full FTA 
can provide. 
 
 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
As discussed, for decades Mexico and South Korea have been firm 
advocates of non-binding, multilateral means to achieve free trade and trans-
Pacific integration.  Over the last several years, though, their respective 
governments have shared the conviction that an FTA can be beneficial for 
both countries and so have taken a series of steps toward the subscription of 
an accord of that sort. 
The results presented in this paper are in line with that conviction.  They 
show that a large potential for expanding trade and investment flows between 
the Mexican and South Korean economies lies dormant and that such 
objective can be attained most effectively by means of an FTA.  On the other 
hand, the formulation and estimation of a gravity model to that end permitted 
the delineation of a formal, systematic methodology that constitutes a 
relevant contribution to the development of a more objective rationale for 
assessing this accord vis-à-vis the essentially inferential, intuitive criteria 
used by other studies that have also been conducted for that purpose. 
After more than four years since they started negotiations and over eleven 
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since they signed their first major bilateral investments agreement, the 
Mexican and South Korean governments have now valid reasons and 
sufficient ground to take the decision to complete the negotiations and finally 
sign the deal which, as this paper shows, can in fact be beneficial for both 
countries.  In this sense, the year 2012 will be a propitious context to do that 
for the two nations will celebrate the 50th anniversary of the establishment of 
formal diplomatic relations and so the beginning of their political, economic 
and cultural interaction. 
 
 
APPENDIX 
 
Dataset Sources and Rationale 
 
Countries 
The 21 APEC member economies which thus became the panel units in 
the model 
 
Period 
The period chosen for the study encompasses 20 years, from 1990 to 2009, 
on the basis that it is long enough for a gravity model fitted on panel data and 
covers virtually all of APEC’s lifespan.  Another reason was because it is a 
period for which more data were available in the relevant databases for all 
the countries and all the variables considered in the model. 
 
Sources 
Most bilateral trade flows data (imports) were taken from the United 
Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database (UN Comtrade), where data 
were available for all APEC countries for that period, except for Taiwan.  In 
the case of the latter, imports data were gotten from the Taiwanese Ministry 
of Finance’s statistical database.  UN Comtrade data were available from the 
SITC Revision 2 product nomenclature. 
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The countries with incomplete entries presented data for the following 
years: Brunei Darussalam: 1990-1994, 1997-1998, 2001-2004, and 2006; 
Papua New Guinea: 1990, 1998, and 2000-2004; Russia: 1996-2009; and 
Viet Nam: 1997-2009.  Data on all the other explanatory variables included 
in the model were restricted to the years for which data on import flows were 
available.  In other words, the size and extent of the dataset were determined 
by the availability of data on imports. 
Data on gross domestic product (GDP) — both total and per capita — 
were taken from the World Bank’s National Accounts Database; the figures 
are in current US dollars and were determined applying the World Bank’s 
Atlas method.  The missing entries for Brunei’s GDP (2007-2009) were 
obtained by converting the GDP figures for those years (in Brunei current 
dollars) into current US dollars using a mid-year exchange rate taken from 
the Oanda.com website.  The missing entry for Hong Kong (2009) was taken 
from the IMF statistics at the Trading Economics.com website.  
Data on GDP and GDP per capita for Taiwan were taken from the World 
Economic Outlook Database (October 2010) of the International Monetary 
Fund. 
 
Size 
Given that the Comtrade database contains numerous missing entries, the 
total number of observations (7,149) fell short of the total possible (8,400), 
i.e., ( 1)* .n n t−   Accordingly, the number of country pairs (398) also fell 
short of the total possible (420). 
In those cases, the criterion was to drop the missing observations from the 
sample.  Other, more desirable options would have been to enter zeros in 
those entries or to use techniques such as Tobit procedures which take 
account of truncated data.  However, these procedures are more complicated 
and, besides, as Baldwin (1994, p. 72) noted, “most studies show that the 
resulting estimates are not substantially affected by the choice of approach”. 
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Table A1 Mexico’s Trade Balance with Korea,  
              1965-1989 (Thousand US Dollars) 
Year Exports Imports Balance 
1965 390.118 18.703 371.415 
1966 375.018 5.754 369.264 
1967 409.944 43.241 366.703 
1968 305.442 89.881 215.561 
1969 908.423 32.427 875.996 
1970 241.216 719.656 –478.44 
1971 194.498 1,348.019 –1,153.521 
1972 130.685 1,267.089 –1,136.404 
1973 168.901 1,432.348 –1,263.447 
1974 946.193 5,764.069 –4,817.876 
1975 119.51 811.288 –691.778 
1976 455.761 1,863.742 –1,407.981 
1977 2,363.804 10,066.21 –7,702.407 
1978 5,035.86 4,174.903 860.957 
1979 8,784.154 1,937.559 6,846.595 
1980 15,899.04 33,468.92 –17,569.885 
1981 68,051.71 26,312.15 41,739.56 
1982 152,799.1 25,434.69 127,364.416 
1983 136,621.6 23,186.06 113,435.51 
1984 157,701.7 18,915.72 138,786.004 
1985 102,887 14,601.44 88,285.573 
1986 90,761 19,653 71,108 
1987 95,645.87 27,804.09 67,841.784 
1988 98,092.42 113,897.9 –15,805.48 
1989 51,331.01 161,052.4 –109,721.392 
Source: Assembled by the author with data from the United Nations Commodity Trade 
Statistics Database (UN Comtrade). 
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Table A2 Mexico’s Trade Balance with Korea,  
1990-2010 (Thousand US Dollars) 
Year Exports Imports Balance 
1990 101,961 184,560 –82,599 
1991 33,781 84,718 –50,937 
1992 43,753 463,983 –420,230 
1993 26,947 475,764 –448,817 
1994 37,850 937,989 –900,139 
1995 88,337 770,560 –682,223 
1996 337,711 1,059,374 –721,663 
1997 212,998 1,641,173 –1,428,174 
1998 136,287 1,822,402 –1,686,115 
1999 150,258 2,780,215 –2,629,957 
2000 293,972 3,689,619 –3,395,647 
2001 208,509 3,531,353 –3,322,844 
2002 161,846 3,909,340 –3,747,494 
2003 181,410 4,112,549 –3,931,139 
2004 110,780 5,227,476 –5,116,695 
2005 241,842 6,495,910 –6,254,068 
2006 457,495 10,621,409 –10,163,914 
2007 680,568 12,613,700 –11,933,132 
2008 537,605 13,527,288 –12,989,684 
2009 498,752 10,946,194 –10,447,442 
Source: Assembled by the author with data from the United Nations Commodity Trade 
Statistics Database (UN Comtrade). 
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Table A3 Trade Potential Ratios among APEC Economies 2009 (I) (Imports) 
Importer 
\ Exporter AUS BRN CAN CHL CHN HKG IDN JPN KOR MYS Average 
Australia 0.000 0.211 2.569 1.555 0.924 1.677 1.557 2.388 0.981 0.282 1.214 
Canada 1.841 23.976 0.000 0.659 0.622 2.689 1.779 2.106 0.748 0.316 3.474 
Chile 6.238 0.000 3.656 0.000 0.730 8.769 2.705 3.248 0.323 1.394 2.706 
China 0.032 0.162 0.126 0.008 0.000 0.238 0.103 0.279 0.157 0.020 0.112 
Hong Kong 2.480 35.705 2.804 0.000 0.789 2.648 0.000 2.300 1.104 0.342 4.817 
Indonesia 0.421 0.134 0.591 0.000 0.533 0.372 0.000 0.696 0.281 0.337 0.336 
Japan 0.194 0.056 0.766 0.095 1.313 4.851 0.260 0.000 2.684 0.141 1.036 
Korea 0.216 0.112 0.984 0.076 3.800 2.661 0.345 3.459 0.000 0.186 1.184 
Malaysia 0.804 2.805 1.840 0.841 1.003 0.523 1.461 0.918 0.514 0.000 1.071 
Mexico 1.480 103.854 1.052 0.297 0.189 0.870 0.592 0.630 0.106 0.048 10.912 
New Zealand 3.667 0.172 8.480 23.885 3.630 7.945 5.415 9.085 3.197 1.149 6.663 
Peru 10.279 2,208.581 5.579 0.927 0.784 6.377 4.243 3.120 0.713 0.790 224.139 
Philippines 1.162 3.611 2.100 0.616 2.835 1.098 0.723 1.954 0.731 0.336 1.517 
Russia 1.906 9,365.353 3.005 0.829 0.807 16.400 1.705 1.725 0.519 0.423 939.267 
Singapore 1.652 6.041 3.484 2.031 1.855 1.667 2.696 2.179 0.592 1.941 2.414 
Taiwan 0.576 341.441 2.379 0.159 3.863 9.867 0.829 2.132 1.949 0.432 36.363 
Thailand 0.341 0.818 1.367 0.546 0.986 1.015 0.789 0.470 0.487 0.327 0.715 
United States 0.427 1.183 0.944 0.221 0.086 0.288 0.145 0.287 0.118 0.033 0.373 
Viet Nam 0.464 0.000 1.643 0.305 0.644 0.732 0.590 0.882 0.222 0.200 0.568 
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Table A4 Trade Potential Ratios among APEC Economies 2009 (II) (Imports) 
Importer / 
Exporter MEX NZL PNG PER PHL RUS SGP THA USA VNM Average 
Australia 3.318 0.719 0.087 4.711 3.940 13.770 0.195 0.210 2.066 0.263 2.928 
Canada 0.992 1.085 16.730 0.460 0.934 6.199 0.602 0.472 9.598 0.388 3.746 
Chile 2.039 7.699 61.856 1.786 3.134 42.026 2.957 1.234 3.951 0.618 12.730 
China 0.207 0.059 0.053 0.021 0.075 0.147 0.034 0.049 0.174 0.136 0.096 
Hong Kong 2.025 1.288 6.724 4.310 1.649 7.073 0.291 0.863 1.963 5.268 3.145 
Indonesia 2.518 0.248 0.445 1.425 1.050 2.156 0.165 0.250 0.759 0.452 0.947 
Japan 1.480 0.375 0.165 0.273 0.601 1.061 0.370 0.234 1.053 0.248 0.586 
Korea 1.995 0.420 0.237 0.235 0.863 0.949 0.169 0.753 1.074 0.520 0.722 
Malaysia 2.028 0.471 0.252 7.834 1.085 8.285 1.199 0.636 0.786 0.427 2.300 
Mexico  0.000 0.635 67.466 1.852 0.180 4.115 0.135 0.139 0.915 0.171 7.561 
New Zealand 21.888 0.000 3.698 26.487 7.909 19.067 0.769 1.400 10.483 3.328 9.503 
Peru 3.301 5.580 193,366.710 0.000 5.966 5.045 2.897 0.651 5.895 1.066 19,339.711 
Philippines 6.547 0.295 0.062 0.370 0.000 3.264 0.152 0.354 0.906 0.304 1.225 
Russia 5.719 1.150 2.793 6.628 2.357 0.000 0.639 0.818 3.458 0.409 2.397 
Singapore 3.216 1.151 1.328 13.071 0.715 2.494 0.000 1.334 1.054 1.015 2.538 
Taiwan 4.570 0.817 7.419 0.558 3.378 2.024 0.389 1.312 1.366 2.208 2.404 
Thailand 2.351 0.440 0.191 1.682 0.554 1.060 0.333 0.000 0.991 1.046 0.865 
United States 0.148 0.218 0.360 0.402 0.107 0.557 0.048 0.059 0.000 0.034 0.193 
Viet Nam 1.898 0.252 0.686 0.353 1.130 0.577 0.064 0.361 1.292 0.000 0.661 
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